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ADAM SMITH’S ECONOMICS
AND THE LECTURES
ON RHETORIC AND BELLES LETTRES.
THE LANGUAGE OF COMMERCE*
Benoît Walraevens
University of  Paris i Panthéon Sorbonne
phare (Pole d’histoire de l’analyse et des representations économiques)
Among the abundant literature devoted to Adam Smith’s complete works, there has
been a relative lack of  interest in the Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles Lettres, especially
from historians of  economic thought. I want to show that this youth’s work is
 essential in understanding Smith’s conception of  economic exchange. The analogy
between the exchange of  sentiments, opinions and goods is developed so that man
may be seen as a ‘commercial’ animal. Economic transactions are seen as means for
men to get the pleasures of  social life and self  approbation. Instead of  highlighting
man’s autonomy and selfishness, Smith underlines the ethical character of  econom-
ic agents made of  justice, prudence, and self  command, and their willingness to be
approved by their fellows and by the impartial spectator.
1. Introduction
nder the light of  Adam Smith’s Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles Lettres
 (lrbl)1 the aim of  this paper will be to reinterpret some Smithian
economic and moral issues. More precisely, it will try to highlight the re-
lationship between discursive practice and economic reality in apparent
simplicity, exchange. According to Smith, the essence and foundation of
exchange and commerce lies in language. The departure point of  this
study will be to examine the dichotomy that he establishes between two
main types of  discourse: the rhetorical discourse and the didactic dis-
course. Didactic discourse is described as aiming at truth whereas
* I have just completed a Ph.D. (December 2009) in the History of  economic thought on
the ethics of  Adam Smith’s economics at phare, University of  Paris i Panthéon Sorbonne.
Address for correspondence: B. Walraevens: e-mail: Benoit.Walraevens@malix.univ-paris1.
fr. I am indebted to Jean Dellemotte, André Hervier, and Saul Hughes and to the two anony-
mous referees for their helpful comments on previous drafts of  this paper. Remaining errors are
mine.
1 lrbl after. See Howell 1975, Skinner 1979, Salber Phillips 2006 for the historical and
theoretical relevance of  Smith’s lrbl. A significant exception is Brown 1994b whose conclu-
sions, especially on the bartering of  the market, are often similar to ours. Yet she does not
 provide a significant account of  the relationship between Smith’s moral philosophy and the
persuasive side of  exchange. In the first section this is the point we will focus on.
U
rhetorical discourse obeys a strictly instrumental logic: it only aims at
reaching an end and persuading by any mean. This distinction can be
used to develop a new approach of  exchange relations. The rhetorical
discourse brings along to the social and human dimension concerning
exchange relations to light. The exchange of  goods requires an agree-
ment obtained by «higgling and bargaining».1 Economics is ‘political econ-
omy’ in the sense that in parallel with the relations of  men to things it is
a science which studies the relations between men themselves. The sup-
ply and demand embody the desires and wants of  men. Therefore, this
leads us to carry out a detailed study of  exchange relationships as moral
and persuasion relationships, revealing the «language of  exchange».
First of  all, we will study the distinction that Smith established in the
lrbl between rhetorical discourse and didactical discourse. That will
enable us to define the rhetorical discourse as persuasion science, as
compared with the didactical discourse which consists in truth seeking.
As he wishes to persuade by all mean to reach his ends, the rhetorician
«moves away» from truth, hoodwinking and deceiving his audience. He
doesn’t impartially treat the topic he studies. He pleads a cause and ma-
nipulates his audience. Besides, some scholars2 recently underlined that
the famous «natural propensity to truck, barter and exchange» comes
from reason and language, and more particularly from the desire to per-
suade. It opens up the possibility to treat exchange relations as persua-
sion, domination, or power relationship and exchange as a bargaining
process.3 It is the «malevolent nature»4 of  exchange that we aim at re-
vealing. To persuade someone that it is their interest to exchange at a
certain price, every mean is justified, including slyness and cheating, lie
and information dissimulation. The example of  the butcher is clear: no
benevolence brought during an exchange. But does it mean that we are
immoral? The question of  the morality of  exchange relations comes in-
to light. In this second point we answer the Adam Smith Problem5
thanks to a brief  examination of  some passages of  The Theory of  Moral
Sentiments.6 There Smith explicitly mentions the wish to be believed and
to be worthy of  this trust, in the same way he previously referred to the
longing for praise and the desire to be praiseworthy. In other words, both
the moral constraint coming from the impartial and internal spectator
on one side, and the public constraint due to the external spectators on
the other side, prevent us from using immoral practices in the exchange.
We want to preserve our reputation and our consciousness. Economic
behaviour is neither immoral nor amoral. Following this the third and
1 See wn, i.v.4. 2 See Brown 1994, Force 2003 and Dellemotte 2005.
3 We follow here the way opened by Brown 1994. 4 See Young 1997.
5 For the state of  the debates, see Montes 2003. 6 tms after.
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last point of  our study tries to identify an analogy between the exchange
of  feelings, opinions and goods. It is a reference to the pleasure of  mu-
tual sympathy which finds its corollary in the pleasure of  persuading. It
underlines the social and human (communicative) dimension of  ex-
change. After being for so long forgotten by the neoclassical model, it
was rediscovered by contemporary economists. This is essential to un-
derstand the key role of  sympathy in the process of  exchanging goods
and it offers an answer to the question of  the unity of  the Smithian cor-
pus. The virtuous character of  economic behaviour is shown through an
examination of  the way commerce fosters prudence, justice and self
command, three of  Smith’s four cardinal virtues.
2. Rhetoric and Exchange
Our starting point is Smith’s claim in the lrbl that there are only two
main kinds of  discourse. More precisely, «every discourse proposes ei-
ther barely to relate some fact, or to prove some proposition» (lrbl,
i.149). The first kind of  discourse is called «narrative» and has to do with
the work of  the historian, while the second one is used by the orator.
The latter is divided by the author into two sorts of  discourse, charac-
terised by their method and their aim: the didactic discourse and the
rhetorical discourse. Within the didactic discourse «instruction is the
main end» thus persuasion only the «secondary design», whereas in the
case of  the rhetorical one the main design is persuasion. Rhetorical dis-
course stands for the individual who «endeavours to persuade us by all
means» (ibidem). So, in that case instruction is neglected or considered
«only so far as it is subservient to perswasion» (ibidem). In a word, in-
struction is subordinated to persuasion. Rhetoric is persuasive while di-
dactic is convincing.
Moreover, a debate can be engaged about the impartiality of  those
different kinds of  discourse. We know the importance of  this word in
Smith’s moral philosophy. Indeed, what Smith underlines is the fact that
the rhetorician, contrary to the man who uses a didactical discourse, is
not an impartial ‘judge’ of  the topics he works on. In other words, the
rhetorician presents a partial point of  view about the question he is
asked. He defends a cause, with no respect for truth:
The former (the didactical discourse) proposes to put before us the arguments on
both sides of  the question giving each its proper degree of  influence, and has it in
view to perswade no farther than the arguments themselves appear convincing. The
Rhetoricall again endeavours by all means to perswade us; and for this purpose it
magnifies all the arguments on the one side and diminished or conceals those that
might be brought on the side contrary to that which it is designed that we should
favour.
(lrbl, i.149; italic added)
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Thus, the rhetorician pleads a cause. Ready to persuade by all means,
he doesn’t look for truth or for fairness anymore. He conceals or min-
imises every fact and argument which contradicts his preconception
while magnifying the ones which can legitimate his cause. Moreover,
he ‘plays’ with people’s feelings, sentiments and passions,1 while the
 didactic thinker addresses their reason only. Being voluntarily unable
of  impartiality, the rhetorician seems morally condemnable or, at least,
seems unworthy of  praise. Didactic discourse attempts to give a fair
representation of  all sides of  the issue rather than just the one sided
partial presentation of  the rhetorical kind. This binary opposition is
reminiscent of  the one settled in Plato’s Gorgias between philosophy
and rhetoric where the latter is compared unfavourably with the for-
mer on the grounds that rhetoric aims at satisfying personal ends and
at conquering power, while philosophy’s quest is intended to reach
 wisdom and the Good. Rhetoric is seen as an art of  pleasure and flat-
tery whose end is persuasion. Philosophy’s end, by contrast, is to find
truth.2
As a result, Smith’s lrbl are mainly aimed at exploring the commu-
nication of  ideas. It is to be seen as part of  Smith’s system and as a fruit-
ful text for exploring moral and economic issues in particular. With an
eye on the latter, it is possible to create a ‘bridge’ between discourse and
exchange, to cast a light on the «language of  exchange». Understanding
the ‘chains’ unifying rhetorical discourse and exchange relationships re-
quires investigating the foundation of  the division of  labour and the
«propensity to truck, barter and exchange». In the wn Smith explains
that the division of  labour «is the necessary, though very slow and grad-
ual consequence of  a certain propensity in human nature…the propen-
sity to truck, barter, and exchange one thing for another» (wn, i.ii.1).
This natural propensity to exchange is a typically human attribute3 be-
cause «nobody ever saw a dog make a fair and deliberate exchange of
one bone for another with another dog» (wn, i.ii.2). What is interesting
here is that Smith does not mention the origin of  this natural propen-
sity to exchange. He hardly suggests that it is probably «the conse-
quence of  the faculty of  reason and speech» (ibidem). It is no surprise,
for in wn Smith is not concerned with first principles. To him, reason
and language are «intimately» linked. He sees language as «a natural
 expression of  our thoughts» – lj(a), ii.54 –, contrary to writing. Besides,
the example of  the two savages who invent the first words in order to
1 See lrbl, ii.38. 2 For more details, see Brown 1994a, 70; 1994b, 16.
3 For Smith, Man is by nature a social being. The inter-subjectivity is the foundation of  his
subjectivity.
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make their desires and wants mutually intelligible1 in the Considerations
concerning the first formation of  languages reveals how the beginning of
commerce cannot be separated from the invention of  language. More
generally, in the lrbl Smith adds that Prose is the language of  com-
merce (whereas Poetry is the language of  pleasure and entertainment).2
As a consequence the development of  commerce allows and requires
the improvement of  language.3 However, it is in the lj that we will find
the real explanation of  the foundation of  the exchange and the division
of  labour:
If  we should enquire into the principle in the human mind on which this disposition
of  trucking is founded, it is clearly the naturall inclination every one has to persuade.
The offering of  a shilling, which to us appears to have so plain and simple a mean-
ing, is in reality offering an argument to persuade one to do so and so as it is for his
interest. Men always endeavour to persuade others to be of  their opinion even when
the matter is of  no consequence to them. If  one advances any thing concerning Chi-
na or the more distant moon which contradicts what you imagine to be true, you im-
mediately try to persuade him to alter his opinion. And in this manner every one is
practising oratory on others thro the whole of  his life. You are uneasy whenever one
differs from you, and you endeavour to persuade him to be of  your mind; or if  you
do not it is a certain degree of  self  command, and to this every one is breeding thro
their whole lives. In this manner they acquire a certain dexterity and address in man-
aging their affairs, or in other words in managing of  men; and this is altogether the
practise of  every man in the most ordinary affairs. This being the constant employ-
ment or trade of  every man, in the same manner as the artisans invent simple meth-
ods of  doing their work, so will each one here endeavour to do this work in the sim-
plest manner. That is bartering, by which they address themselves to the self  interest
of  the person and seldom fail immediately to gain their end.
(lj(a), vi.57)
So, exchange is founded on this «desire of  persuading, of  leading and di-
recting other people», which «seems to be one of  the strongest of  all our
natural desires. It is, perhaps, the instinct upon which is founded the
 faculty of  speech, the characteristical faculty of  human nature» (tms,
vii.iv.25). The individuals who carry out an exchange may now be con-
ceived as rhetoricians, and the exchange as a bargaining process. We are
able to explain why the natural propensity to truck, barter and exchange
is a human characteristic. It is founded on the desire to persuade which
is itself  a desire of  approbation, more precisely a desire of  approbation
in relation to our opinions and ideas. Rhetoric is the foundation of  hu-
man life. We have a strong desire to persuade because we need others
if  we want to satisfy our desires and our needs. Unlike animals, human
1 Here lies the difference between Man and the animal because Man needs to satisfy his
 desires but also to make them recognized by others.
2 No pleasure and entertainment in commerce?
3 Specifically Prose. See lrbl,ii.115.
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beings are fundamentally dependent on others’ assistance for their sur-
vival.1 That’s why they are endowed with the faculty of  speech in order
to persuade them to do what they need. For it is «by treaty, by barter,
and by purchase, that we obtain from one another the greater part of
those mutual good offices which we stand in need of» (wn, i.ii.3). We
practise oratory through the all of  our lives, and «the offering of  a
shilling, which to us appears to have so plain and simple a meaning, is
in reality offering an argument to persuade one to do so»: lj(a), vi.57.
Furthering this point, we approve of  others’ opinions in the same way
we approve of  their moral sentiments, by sympathising. The desire of
approbation comes from the pleasure of  mutual sympathy.2 And sym-
pathy is typically a human attribute and the key to the social nature of
Man. A second explanation is explicitly given by Smith in the passage
mentioned below. The propensity to truck is founded on the desire to
persuade and «this is the instinct upon which is founded the faculty of
speech, a characteristical faculty of  human nature.» The use of  the ex-
pressions «faculty of  speech» and «reason and speech» leads us to believe
that what Smith has in mind here is not language in a narrow sense but
rather the Aristotelian logos, the power of  reasoning and expressing
one’s ideas. So, persuasion, language and exchange are inseparable.
Men possess an innate desire to persuade; so they spend their whole life
exercising their power of  persuasion. In the xviiith century the word
‘commerce’ had a broader sense than today. It meant diffusion, com-
munication, propagation.3 It was not restricted to economic relation-
ships. That’s why we can say that throughout his works Smith describes
Man as a «commercial» or an «exchanging animal». He exchanges words
and ideas in the lrbl and the Considerations concerning the first formation
of  languages, feelings and moral sentiments in the tms, and goods in the
wn. Moreover, there is a pleasure in persuading in the same manner
there is a pleasure in mutual sympathy.4 Finally, persuasion is an end in
itself  for Smith. We exchange goods not only for the goods themselves
but in order to persuade others and obtain this pleasure of  persuading,
even if  we know we are mistaking.5
1 «In almost every other race of  animals each individual, when it is grown up to maturity,
is intirely independent, and in its natural state has occasion for the assistance of  no other liv-
ing creature. But man has almost constant occasion for the help of  his brethren» (wn, i.ii.2).
2 I develop this point in i.iii.
3 For instance, Smith’s use of  the term in its broader sense is explicit in lj(a), iv.13 and tms,
iii.3.7.
4 See Dellemotte 2005 for the relationship between sympathy and the desire to persuade.
5 This is true for most people but not, Smith adds, for the man of  virtue who has enough
self  command not to be corrupted.
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3. The Morality of Exchange
Defining people engaged in the exchange of  goods as rhetoricians
 provides us with significant clues to understand their behaviour in the
marketplace. A rhetorician is one who pleads a cause and whose pri-
mary design is to persuade by every means. Economic agents plead
their cause too. They try to satisfy their personal interest. If  we com-
pare them with rhetoricians, does it mean that they will endeavour to
satisfy their own interest by every means? The ‘selfish’ character of  the
economic man seems to find some textual support.1 Rhetorical dis-
course and power are intrinsically linked, the rhetorical discourse being
at the beginning the science of  men aspiring to political power.2 Smith
explicitly defines the faculty of  speech and the desire of  persuading as
useful instruments for governing men.3 As a consequence, exchange re-
lationships become power and domination relationships. It is interest-
ing to notice that Smith describes a «learning process». In other words,
the individuals who are often persuaded, led and directed because of
their lack of  rhetorical ability will not remain infinitely dominated by
others since «from being led and directed by other people we learn to
wish to become ourselves leaders and directors.» (tms, vii.iv.24). The
traditional presentation of  exchange as a mutually beneficial process is
called into question. This malevolent side of  exchange is concealed by
the fact that exchange is built on an agreement and based on this prin-
ciple: «Give me that which I want, and you shall have this which you
want» (wn, i.ii.2). The most important point is that the individual who
dominates does not let his (or her) superiority appear and that he man-
ages to give the other one the impression he is not dominated. It main-
ly consists of  making believe4 the other one that it is his interest to ex-
change, without knowing if  it is really the case. What matters is only to
persuade5 in order to reach one’s ends. Rhetorical discourse aims at
 persuading by all means. This being so, to cheat, to lie, to mislead or to
1 A close look at Smith’ moral theory reveals how deceptive this interpretation can be. See
below, pp. 13-15. 2 See Plato’s Gorgias for example.
3 «No other animal possesses this faculty, and we cannot discover in any other animal any
desire to lead and direct the judgment and conduct of  its fellows. Great ambition, the desire of
real superiority, of  leading and directing, seems to be altogether peculiar to man, and speech
is the great instrument of  ambition, of  real superiority, of  leading and directing the judgments
and conduct of  other people» (tms, vii.iv.24).
4 «Man continually standing in need of  the assistance of  others, must fall upon some means
to procure their help. This he does not merely by coaxing and courting; he does not expect it
unless he can turn it to your advantage or make it appear to be so»: lj(a), vi.45.
5 «But man has almost constant occasion for the help of  his brethren, and it is in vain for
him to expect it from benevolence only. He will be more likely to prevail if  he can interest their
self  love in his favour, and shew them that it is for their own advantage to do for him what he
requires of  them» (wn, i.ii.2).
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hide information become means to persuade someone, creating what
we call today asymmetric information. The language of  exchange is not a
language of  truth.1 Rhetoric is a source of  power: the power of  direct-
ing, manipulating others minds. It reveals the absolute power of  lan-
guage to govern Men.
As a consequence, the question of  the morality of  exchange rela-
tionships is asked. In a ‘scholastic’ perspective, when someone hood-
winks and deceives or ‘hides’ any fundamental information, the ex-
change resulting from the bargaining is morally condemnable.2 Along
the same line, it seems possible to point out a moral condemnation of
exchange relationships inside a strictly Smithian body of  theory. Indeed,
in the manner of  the rhetorician the individual performing an ex-
change, aiming solely at his personal gain, adopts a partial point of  view
on the exchange situation. He will naturally defend his cause, leaving
aside any information which could be unfavourable to him while high-
lighting and magnifying every argument which serves him. Contrary to
the historian, he is not «an impartial narrator of  facts»,3 he pleads a
cause. Being unable of  impartiality, the individual who exchanges using
lie and cheat may be morally condemnable for he or she would not get
the approbation of  the impartial spectator. In other words, he would
not be worthy of  being believed. Here comes the spectrum of  the Adam
Smith Problem.4 Do we have in Smith’s economic treatise people who
are immoral? Do they keep a proper, respectable and virtuous degree
of  self  love or is human nature essentially selfish? To answer this ques-
tion, we have to keep in mind that for Smith man is a social being who
wants nothing else than being looked at, loved and admired by his fel-
low citizens.5 But he does not only look for praise contrary to what
Mandeville or La Rochefoucauld asserted in their «licentious systems»
(tms, vii.ii.4.7). They are condemned for being pernicious because they
destroy the distinction between vice and virtue (tms, vii.ii.4.6). In op-
position with them, Smith claims that men would be mortified if  they
were praised without being praiseworthy. According to Smith, the de-
sire of  approbation is one of  the strongest of  our desires. Two different
1 See Brown 1994a.
2 See Young 86 for a just price interpretation of  Smith’s theory of  value.
3 lrbl, ii.40, i.83.
4 For a very rich and historical account of  the Adam Smith Problem see Montes 2003. Pa-
ganelli 2008 tries a reversal of  the asp by arguing that tms presents a more favourable account
of  self  interest than wn does.
5 We agree with Kalyvas and Katznelson 2001, 553, who write that for Smith «markets are
not simply, or exclusively arenas for the instrumental quest by competitive and strategic indi-
viduals to secure their material preferences … they are a central mechanism for social integra-
tion derived not from strategic self  interest but rather from the inexorable struggle by human
agents for moral approbation and social recognition».
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tribunals will judge our conduct: the external spectators and the inter-
nal one. The actual spectators may be misleading because they can be
manipulated (by rhetoricians) in their passions and sentiments. The role
of  the impartial spectator is precisely to correct the imperfection of
their judgments1 by looking at ourselves as if  we were an external ob-
server of  the scene. The judgment on our own conduct is based on the
same principle that when we judge the conduct of  another man. We ap-
prove of  our own conduct when, placing ourselves in the situation of
another and view it «with his eyes and from his station», we can enter
into and sympathise with the sentiments and motives which influenced
it. This is the voice of  reason, of  man’s conscience. Two modes of  ap-
probation are presented to us. On one side there is the social approba-
tion, or the approbation of  others. On the other hand we find our own,
inner approbation, or the approbation of  the impartial spectator. The
latter constitutes a higher tribunal, representing the ethical standard.
When we get the approbation of  the impartial spectator, we can be
«more indifferent about the applause, and, in some measure, despise the
censure of  the world; secure that, however misunderstood or misrep-
resented, we are the natural and proper objects of  approbation» (tms,
iii.i.5). The social standard is explicitly associated with misrepresenta-
tions and misunderstanding while that of  the impartial spectator comes
along with virtue and deserves love and reward (tms, iii.i.6). Working
from this point, he develops the seminal role of  conscience in our lives
by asserting that man has a natural desire, not only to be praised, but to
be praiseworthy. The consciousness of  being praiseworthy compen-
sates for the lack of  actual praise. The approbation of  the inner tribu-
nal is a consolation for men’s erroneous judgments. Very generally,
Smith’s point is that we must discern actual from deserved praise, the
latter. For «the most sincere praise can give little pleasure when it can-
not be considered as some sort of  proof  of  praise-worthiness» (tms,
iii.2.4). being much superior to the former as it is the nearest approxi-
mation of  the truth of  moral judgment.2 Is there a correspondence be-
tween the two modes of  discourse and the two modes of  moral judg-
ment? We come close of  the answer when he explains that in the same
way as we desire to be praised and to be praiseworthy, we crave to be
believed and to be worthy of  being so:
so we cannot always be satisfied merely with being believed, unless we are at the
same time conscious that we are really worthy of  belief… It is always mortifying not
1 See a paragraph from edition 1 where Smith states that «common looking glasses are ex-
tremely deceitful» (tms, 112).
2 The man within the breast is only a semi-god. The perfection of  moral judgment is the
privilege of  God.
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to be believed, and it is doubly so when we suspect that it is because we are supposed
to be unworthy of  belief  and capable of  seriously and wilfully deceiving. To tell a
man that he lies, is of  all affronts the most mortal.
(tms, vii.iv.24-26)
The duality of  moral judgments is reflected in the realm of  intellec-
tual judgments. There is a striking analogy between the exchange of
sentiments and the exchange of  opinions. Being believed means noth-
ing else than being approved in our ideas by real spectators. On the
other hand, following Smith’s concept of  praise worthiness we argue
that being worthy of  belief  has to do with the approbation of  the im-
partial spectator. Smith’s theory of  the communication of  ideas is to
be found in his lrbl. That’s why, we claim, his dichotomy of  the two
kinds of  discourse can be used to understand these lines. Opinions and
ideas are believed when they are approved by actual spectators. While
they are worthy of  belief  as far as the imaginary and ideal spectator
approves them. Persuasion is opposed to conviction, the rhetoric to
the didactic discourse. The end of  the rhetorician is to be believed,
even though he is wrong, to get the pleasure of  persuading. For «if  a
person asserts anything about the moon, tho’it should not be true, he
will find a kind of  uneasiness in being contradicted, and would be very
glad that the person he is endeavouring to perswade should be of  the
same of  thinking with himself»: lj(b), 222-223. His esthetical pleasure,
as will be shown below, lies in the beauty of  the harmony of  minds.
His language is partial and deceitful. The didactic thinker, by contrast,
strives for truth. He is worthy of  belief  because his opinions are the
nearest approximation of  the truth of  intellectual judgments. His lan-
guage is just and impartial. He displays arguments on both sides of  the
issue, giving each of  them its proper weight. He is an impartial spec-
tator of  his topic and represents the figure of  the judge, as opposed to
the rhetorician which personifies that of  the advocate. The didactic
discourse is that of  the virtuous man whose tranquillity of  mind re-
flects the pleasure of  inner approbation. He is endowed with enough
self  command to resist the natural temptation of  desiring to persuade
in every circumstances.1
With this in mind, what can be said about the morality of  people in-
volved in exchanging goods? How can we transpose these considera-
tions to the market? Reputation (the external, public constraint) and
merit (the internal, personal constraint) are central features of  social
1 «Man always endeavours to persuade others to be of  their opinion even when the matter
is of  no consequence to them…You are uneasy when one differs from you, and you endeavour
to persuade him to be of  your mind; or if  you do not do it is a certain degree of  self  command»:
lj(a), vi.57.
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and economic lives within which confidence arises from «frankness and
openness» (tms, vii.iv.28). These two kinds of  constraint (sociality and
consciousness) explain why probity1 is a distinctive virtue of  commer-
cial societies and why the economic exchange is globally ‘immunized’
against immoral practices. In other words, the individuals carrying out
exchange are not selfish but self-interested: they respect the rules of  jus-
tice because they respect each other and themselves. It makes them
trusted and trustworthy. While trust is to be considered as the result of
the approbation of  our ideas, that is, of  rhetorical discourses, trust-
worthiness is to be seen as the consequence of  men’s use of  didactic
 discourses. For someone trustworthy is, to use our analogy, worthy of
belief  and praise. Consequently, the probity of  men in commercial
 societies is a consequence of  their use of  didactic discourses in social in-
tercourse. They are deeply concerned with their honour (the internal
spectator) and their reputation (the external spectators). People want to
be approved, and to be worthy of  approval. They are naturally led from
the use of  rhetorical discourses to the use of  didactic discourses. What
does it mean for market process? Both free competition and consumer’s
satisfaction will compel merchants to use didactic discourses, that is, to
sell commodities at their ‘true’ price. For if  one of  them deceives the
buyers (the goods are of  much inferior quality that was claimed, or they
are cheaper elsewhere while it had been refuted) in order to persuade
them to buy his products, he will immediately be ‘sanctioned’ by the
market. Disappointed consumers will choose another seller. Probity,
Smith underlines, comes from the merchant’s regard for his own inter-
est. Anxious of  «losing his character», he is «scrupulous in observing
every engagement». For «when a person makes perhaps 20 contracts in
a day, he cannot gain so much by endeavouring to impose on his neigh-
bours, as the very appearance of  a cheat would make him lose»: lj(b),
327. The frequency of  dealings is crucial here. When people seldom deal
with one another, their reputation is not threatened. There Smith con-
trasts public with private life. Politician are said to be «somewhat dis-
posed to cheat, because they can gain more by a smart trick than they
can lose by the injury which it does their character» (ibidem). In oppo-
sition with them, «a prudent dealer, who is sensible of  his real interest,
would rather chuse to lose what he has a right to than give any ground
for suspicion.»: lj(b), 328. If  merchants want to be approved, they need
be honest. The fairness in exchange is the natural consequence of  man’s
sociability, consciousness and independence in commercial societies.2
1 «Whenever commerce is introduced into any country, probity and punctuality always ac-
company it.»: lj(b), 327.
2 The importance of  independence will be furthered in part ii.
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Animated by a moderate self-love, people are prudent1 and hence,
praiseworthy (tms, vii.ii.3.16). For prudence2 is entirely approved by the
impartial spectator.3 That’s why commerce is among men as among
 nations mutually beneficial:
A free commerce on a fair consideration must appear to be advantageous on both sides.
We see that it must be so betwixt individualls, unless one of  them be fool and makes
a bargain plainly ruinous; but betwixt prudent men it must always be advantageous.
For the very cause of  the exchange must be that you need my goods more than I need
them, and that I need yours more than you do yourself; and if  the bargain be man-
aged with ordinary prudence it must be profitable on both. It is the same thing with
regard to nations.
(lj(a), vi.160; my emphasis)
This quote makes an explicit link between commerce and virtue. For
people must be prudent for trades to be mutually beneficial. Dogs nev-
er make «fair and deliberate»4 exchanges but humans do. To conclude,
we don’t face the Adam Smith Problem. The man of  the tms and the
man of  the wn are a one and only person. Economic behaviour is
deeply rooted in human nature and fosters cardinal virtues such as pru-
dence and justice.
1 In the tms Smith explains that in the race for wealth the one who will not be «fair play»
will be blamed by his fellows. As a consequence, he is naturally led, thanks to the impartial
spectator, to lower his self  love and to be self  interested rather than selfish:
«Though it may be true, therefore, that that every individual, in his own breast, naturally
prefers himself  to all mankind, yet he dares not look mankind in the face, and avow that he
acts according to this principle. He feels that in this preference they can never go along with
him, and that how natural soever it may be to him, it must always appear excessive and ex-
travagant to them. When he views himself  in the light in which he is conscious that others will
view him, he sees that to them he is but one of  the multitude in no respect better than any oth-
er in it. If  he would act so as that the impartial spectator may enter into the principles of  his
conduct, which is of  all things he has the greatest desire to do, he must, upon this, as upon all
other occasions, humble the arrogance of  his self  love, and bring it down to something which
other men can go along with. They will indulge it so far as to allow him to be more anxious
about, and to pursue with more earnest assiduity, his own happiness than that of  any other per-
son. Thus far, whenever they place themselves in his situation, they will readily go along with
him. In the race for wealth, and honours, and preferments, he may run as hard as he can, and
strain every nerve and every muscle, in order to outstrip all his competitors. But if  he should
justle, or throw down any of  them, the indulgence of  the spectators is entirely at an end. It is
a violation of  fair play, which they cannot admit of. This man is to them, in every respect, as
good as he: they do not enter into that self  love by which he prefers himself  so much to this
other, and cannot go along with the motive for which he hurt him. They readily, therefore, sym-
pathize with the natural resentment of  the injured, and the offender becomes the object of  this
hatred and indignation. He is sensible that he becomes so, and feels that those sentiments are
ready to burst out from all sides against them».
(tms, ii.ii.2.1)
See also tms, iii.3.4 on the role of  conscience in lowering self-love.
2 The sincerity of  the prudent man is underlined in tms, vi.i.8. 3 tms, vi.i.11.
4 wn, i.ii.2.
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4. Sympathy and Exchange
Going further, as Young1 rightly argued we can think that Smith be-
lieves economics fits within a broad moral social science. Indeed, his
three major works are hierarchically connected and the most important
for him is the tms as it «provides the general theory of  human nature
and morality which informs the more particular inquiries into law,
 government and economics… In moving from morality to jurispru-
dence to political economy he is moving from the general to the
 particular; from the higher levels of  abstraction to the lower. Moral
 philosophy shades into jurisprudence, which in turn shades into eco-
nomics».2 Since the last quarter of  the twentieth century many works3
have dealt with the idea that the tms and the wn are consistent and,
 furthermore, parts of  an incomplete system. At the end of  the tms and
again in a letter to La Rochefoucauld4 Smith himself  confessed he in-
tended to provide such a system, including a history of  jurisprudence.5
Our attempt to recover the unity of  Smith’s thought in this work
 focuses on the compatibility of  the tms and the wn with the lrbl. To
this purpose, we study the links between sympathy and exchange. This
analysis allows us to shed light on the various, seminal features of
 exchange. First, it is a process: time matters, we are in a dynamic ap-
proach. More precisely, it is a communication process: debating is es-
sential and founded on a common language. Moreover it is a bargain-
ing process: each one is urged by the desire to persuade and uses his
(her) rhetorical abilities to reach his (her) ends by putting himself  in the
place of  others and by playing with their feelings and sentiments. More
generally, it is fundamentally a human and social process: man is a pas-
sion being, he strives to get the approbation of  his fellows. Persuasion
is the end of  communication. Sympathy, we argue, is needed to be suc-
cessful in communicating our sentiments as well as our opinions. The
‘commerce of  sympathy’ pervades economic relationships.
We asserted that exchange relationships are persuasion relationships
because the individuals who are in the process of  exchanging are
rhetoricians. And rhetoric is a kind of  discourse. As a consequence, the
exchange involves a discussion process and according to Smith discus-
sion is the very place par excellence to practise sympathy.6 In the tms
1 See also Winch 1978. 2 Young 1997.
3 See Skinner 1979, Young 1997, Otteson 2002, Fitzgibbons 1994 to name a few.
4 tms, vii.iv.37; Smith 1987, 237.
5 The lj certainly are the material on which he would have built such an history.
6 «But if  you have either no fellow feeling for the misfortunes I have met with, or none that
bears any proportion to the grief  which distracts me; or if  you have either no indignation at
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discussion is almost synonymous with social life. He explains that we
approve the feelings of  others in the same way as we approve of  their
opinions, by an imaginary change in position, namely sympathy: «The
great pleasure of  conversation and society, besides, arises from a certain
correspondence of  sentiments and opinions, from a certain harmony of
minds» (tms, vii.iv.27; my emphasis). When doing so, we judge of  the
propriety or impropriety of  the affections or opinions of  other men by
estimating their concord or dissonance with our own. Passions will ap-
pear suitable and proper to their objects if  the sympathetic passions of
the spectator are keeping with the original passions of  the principally
concerned person. I will approve of  your opinions if  I sympathise with
them, which is to say if  I endorse them because your arguments con-
vinced me.1 Man’s social nature naturally leads him to look out for the
other’s agreement, for their approbation of  his opinions or passions, for
the sake of  the pleasure residing in harmony. To look for an agreement
when exchanging goods is a way to get the approbation of  my ideas on
the goods (its characteristics and price) and above all to test my power
of  directing men. As Dellemotte2 rightly noticed, we are likely to imag-
ine a strategic use of  sympathy within the exchange process.3 In the
 lrbl Smith explains how the rhetorician, and as a consequence the
 exchanging individual, plays with people’s feelings, sentiments and
 passions to persuade his audience. The diffusion and communication of
feelings, passions and sentiments is achieved through the capacity of
the injuries I have suffered, or none that bears any proportion to the resentment which trans-
ports me, we can no longer converse upon this subjects. We become intolerable to one an-
other» (tms, i.i.4.5)
1 «To approve of  another man’s opinions is to adopt those opinions, and to adopt them is to
approve of  them. If  the same arguments which convince you convince me likewise, I neces-
sarily approve of  your conviction; and if  they do not, I necessarily disapprove of  it: neither can
I possibly conceive that I should do the one without the other. To approve or disapprove, there-
fore, of  the opinions of  others is acknowledged, by every body, to mean no more than to ob-
serve their agreement or disagreement with our own. But this is equally the case with regard
to our approbation or disapprobation of  the sentiments or passions of  others» (tms, i.i.3.2)
2 See Dellemotte 2005.
3 We follow Danner’s interpretation who convincingly argued that the mutual and recipro-
cal coordination needed in economic interactions arises from the phenomenon of  sympathy.
This interpretation is rejected by Werhane because «Smith does not use the term ‘sympathy’
in the wn …and sympathy is not a principle of  motivation». Yet she misses the point. Heavily
influenced by Turgot and Cantillon, Smith understood the market process at a macroeconomic
level in which aggregate supply and aggregate demand are the key factors and the bargaining
process vanishes. He did not provide a comprehensive analysis of  the «higgling of  the market»
because its influence on the final result is supposed to be inexistent. The market price tends to
be equal to the natural price, or to reveal the objective characteristics of  the goods. Language
is therefore a transparent medium as it does not affect the final values (see Brown 1994, 73-74
for more details). Maybe that’s why the word is absent from the wn. Moreover, in this paper
we argue that sympathy is essential to reach an agreed valuation as an efficient cause of  ex-
change and not as its final cause. Self  interest is my end and this end is achieved by means of
sympathy. See Werhane 1989 and Danner 1976.
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sympathy. The idea is to get some information about the person you ex-
change with. In other words this is a way to discover his preferences.
The more you figure out people’s character and temper the better you
will reach your own ends. In modern, commercial societies, it is para-
doxically by ‘plunging’ myself  into you that I achieve ‘my self ’.1 The
repetition of  exchanges (social interactions) with the same person (cus-
tomer, buyer or seller), or a group of  persons you identify thanks to
your experience, should allow you to reach more easily agreements
(sympathy and approbation) afterwards.
Nonetheless, sympathy is not only an essential component but it is
 also a pre-requisite to the exchange process. Indeed, if  people want to
discuss they have to share a common language. This common language
allows a mutual comprehension which is fundamental in every coordi-
nation issue. Those people have to share common values and knowl-
edge. Thanks to his concepts of  sympathy and impartial spectator
Smith explains in the tms this organic or spontaneous genesis of  com-
mon beliefs and values. Communication is at the core of  the emergence
of  moral values and norms. In this scheme the impartial spectator may
be represented as an internalisation of  social interactions. He will
‘memorize’ the episodes of  approbation and disapprobation. If  people
sympathised with my affection in a given situation or if  they approved
of  my opinions I will tend to reproduce this behaviour and opinions. If
my opinions (my arguments about the qualities of  the goods and its
price) didn’t convince many spectators (buyers) I will correct it (to cut
price) in order to get their approbation (to sell). This is a «self-strength-
ened» mechanism, a natural, spontaneous or organic emergence of
common values2 and knowledge. Moral norms emerge as a result of  an
unconscious evolutionary process. Commerce is an important not to
1 Our social interactions, including here the exchange of  goods, foster our own conscious-
ness.
2 The emergence of  economic (prices) and moral values (norms of  behaviour) seems to be
founded on a similar ‘evolutionary’ process of  trials and errors. This perspective was adopted
by Otteson 2002 who brilliantly explained Smith’s marketplace of  morality. He shows that the
standards of  moral judgments arise unintentionally from the moral judgments and actions of
individuals and that the standards that develop in this way constitute a self  regulating order.
This market model of  unintended order is then extended to explain the formation of  economic
and linguistic norms as well. Otteson claims that the market model is Smith’s overall repre-
sentation of  human institutions. I agree with him on this point. Yet, even if  he points out the
analogy between the three models, they are presented in separate ways. It is as if  the emer-
gence of  economic rules (prices) was independent of  the emergence of  moral rules. My argu-
ment in this article is that moral and linguistic norms are essential to the working of  the «eco-
nomic» market. The process that leads to the formation of  economic values is not merely
analogous to the one giving rise to the formation of  moral values, it is build upon it. The mu-
tual benefits of  exchange relationships are founded on the ethical character of  economic
agents. Probity, prudence, and fairness are successful qualities in both economic and social life.
Fair practices give rise to fair exchanges at fair prices.
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say fundamental element of  social life in modern societies.1 The norms
prevailing in this sphere are some way the result of  the internalisation
of  sympathetic experiences by the impartial spectator. The market is to
be seen as the ‘agora’ of  modern, commercial societies. There people
exchange sentiments and opinions on goods and debate on prices and
quantities.
Therefore, we would like to underline the great similarity between
the exchange of  goods and the exchange of  sentiments and passions by
briefly defining a model of  bilateral exchange of  goods. When two in-
dividuals try to exchange affections, there is an agent who feels the orig-
inal passion, and a spectator who tries to sympathise with him and who
feels a sympathetic passion. What is important here is the fact that the
intensity of  the original passion is necessarily higher than the one of  the
sympathetic passion because sympathy is an imaginary change in posi-
tions and an imperfect mechanism. The spectator will never be able to
plainly enter in the agent’s character or to exactly know the objects of
his passion. However, even if  the spectator will never feel the passion of
the agent with the same intensity, a ‘harmony’, a ‘concord’ may be at-
tained thanks to the pleasure of  mutual sympathy. By his self  command
the agent will lower the intensity of  his passion for the spectator to sym-
pathise with him, while the spectator will increase his own by trying to
enter into every circumstance which may have caused the passion. By
doing so, they will reach a ‘propriety point’. Mutual sympathy will then
arise. In this ‘model’ the convergence of  feelings is attained through the
pleasure of  mutual sympathy. That underlines the innate tendency of
men to look for the approbation of  others. We are convinced that there
is here a striking parallel with a bilateral exchange of  goods. On the one
side, the agent would be a seller who wants to sell at the highest price.
On the other side, the spectator would be a buyer, who wants to buy at
the lowest price. Once again, a convergence may be attained because
there is pleasure in persuading in the same way there is pleasure in mu-
tual sympathy.2 The desire to be believed is a desire of  approbation, and
to approve of  someone’s feelings or opinions means nothing else than
sympathising with them. The buyer and the seller will strive for an
agreement in order to get this pleasure and will exchange at what we
call a ‘propriety price’. To reach an agreed valuation, each one has to go
beyond his partial and selfish position. As Kennedy rightly argued, «bar-
1 Griswold 1999, 297 rightly argued that for Smith «life in a market society is an ongoing
exercise in rhetoric».
2 Furthering this point, we add that man’s willingness to be approved and, therefore, to
 persuade, is also the result of  the ‘pain’ associated with disapprobation which finds its corol-
lary in the ‘uneasiness’ of  being contradicted. See tms, i.ii.1 and lj(b), 222.
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gainers must be other-centred, not self-centred».1 They have to satisfy
the other’s self  love if  they want to satisfy their own. To reach an out-
come agreeable to both, they must contain their self  love, tending to-
ward a position of  impartiality. Once more, the market can be seen as
a public place in which we are educated to self  command and to im-
partiality. Let me now briefly describe the process leading to the ‘pro-
priety price’. Our market is composed of  one seller and one buyer. The
final outcome will depend on each one’s negotiation or communication
power. The price range is defined by a high bound (the buyer’s highest
price he wants to pay) and by a low bound (the seller’s minimum price
to cover his production costs). Every acceptable price (propriety prices)
for both is included into this price range. The buyer will try to take the
seller’s place to discover his minimum price. Sympathy is also to be used
by the individuals involved in the bargaining process to play with each
other’s passions. As a result, if  the agreed valuation is nearer from the
low bound it means that the buyer’s communication and negotiation
power is stronger than the seller’s one. The buyer will get a greater part
of  the surplus. From this point, it is possible to imagine a ‘just’ price,
distinct from ‘propriety’ prices. Smith is clear that we exchange if  and
only if  our well being is increased. For «the very cause of  the exchange
must be that you need my goods more than I need them and that I need
yours more than you do yourself»: lj(a), vi.160. The ideal and just re-
sult of  the bargaining process is reached, we claim, when the gains are
equally divided among the participants, that is, when their respective
outcomes are equal. This ‘just’ price is perfectly in the middle of  the
price range, where every change in price leads to a fall of  one’s well be-
ing. In analytical terms, some assumptions are needed to reach that op-
timal result. One of  them was implicit in our reasoning. People involved
in the exchange must have equal rhetorical power; otherwise one of
them will naturally use his superiority to get the greatest part of  the sur-
plus. Doing so, he will come nearer of  his ‘maximising point’, consid-
ered here, if  he is the seller (respectively the buyer), as the high (low)
bound of  the price range. We add that symmetry of  positions, or social
status, is needed. For people engaged in a subordination relationship
will not be prompt to contradict their superiors.2 To conclude on this
point, the pleasure to exchange is a pleasure to persuade and to get the
approbation of  someone on our own valuation of  the goods. The ex-
change of  goods seems similar to the exchange of  sentiments. An ‘equi-
1 See Kennedy 2008.
2 See part ii, where it is shown that the employment relationship exhibits none of  these as-
sumptions. Consequently, the distribution of  the surplus between capital owners and workers
is unjust and suboptimal. The growth rate is then, too, suboptimal.
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librium’ is reached through a (dynamic) process, restoring order and
tranquillity thanks to the harmony1 of  minds it creates. Going further,
we agree with Griswold to claim that the exchange process «is not mere-
ly analogous to the process of  sympathy described in the tms: it is built
upon it».2
However, the link between sympathy and exchange is more complex
than it appears at first sight. Indeed, sympathy requires social proximi-
ty. It is very difficult to sympathise with someone we don’t know.3 With
this background in mind, it becomes interesting to reread the famous
passage of  the butcher, the brewer and the backer in the wn. Commer-
cial society is defined as one in which every man is a merchant. It means
he lives by exchanging the surplus part of  the produce of  his labour
against that of  other men. Men become entirely dependent on others
for the satisfaction of  their needs. What art will they use to get what
they want from their fellows? Man, it is said, must work «on the selflove
of  his fellows, by setting before them a sufficient temptation to get what
he wants»: lj(b), 220. Smith says that the individuals in economic inter-
actions have in mind their own advantage. Why aren’t they assumed to
be benevolent? A commonplace argument is that we cannot be benev-
olent in the marketplace because we are facing strangers. The supposed
impersonality of  the market is seen as allowing little room for specta-
tor mechanisms to work in this arena.4 Therefore, this lack of  social
proximity could lower the importance of  sympathy and benevolence in
the exchange of  goods. Indeed, the more you know people, the better
you sympathise with them and the more benevolent you are toward
them. Benevolence can be seen as the result of  repeated sympathy.5 So
that we could nonetheless imagine the gradual appearance of  benevo-
lence in economic intercourses by the repetition of  interactions as the
individuals involved would know each other better and better. Besides,
Young convincingly argued that sympathy’s effectiveness is more close-
ly tied to physical distance than social distance.6 What is seminal to
 sympathise is to see and to be seen. We are able to sympathise with
strangers if  we meet face to face.7 However, Smith’s plea for self  love in
economic interactions is founded on a plain argument. Human nature
is much more self  interested than benevolent. Nature has endowed man
with a strong love of  himself  for him to survive. Smith is not weary to
repeat that man’s satisfaction of  his basic needs would be threatened if
1 This is an esthetical and disinterested pleasure. There is an esthetical pleasure for the man
of  system too, coming from his observation of  the harmony and the order of  society in which
many people «act in concert». See tms, iv.1.11.
2 See Griswold 1999, 297-298. 3 See tms, i.i.3.4.
4 See Viner 1972, 82. 5 See Nieli 1986.
6 See tms, iii.3.4. 7 See Young 1986, 371.
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it was not so.1 When people «address themselves to the self  interest of
the person», they «seldom fail immediately to gain their end»: lj(a),
vi.57. Man expects anything from self  love, since it is a much more pow-
erful spring than benevolence.2 That’s why he is said to be more suc-
cessful if  he addresses to their self  love. It is no more than the best strat-
egy to persuade them.3
Our second argument lowering the importance of  sympathy in ex-
change has to do with the ‘essence’ of  sympathy. This is a more funda-
mental objection. We can easily think of  a seller trying to make an imag-
inary, strategic change of  position in order to discover what the buyer’s
personal interest is. But the specificity of  this imaginary change of  po-
sition comes from the fact that it is the seller’s self  love which motivates
him to «take the buyer’s position». It is not, contrary to sympathy, a
spontaneous and disinterested change of  position.4 In the exchange of
goods a distinctive form of  sympathy appears: what we call an ‘inter-
ested sympathy’. Using Aristotle’s words, we can say that self  interest
undoubtedly is the exchange’s final cause, while its efficient cause is
sympathy. In order to satisfy my self  love I need to know yours. That’s
why I have to look at the situation from your point of  view. Sympathy
and self  interest are not contradictory human motives. By looking at us
with the eyes of  others, sympathy allows us to understand our interest
in a true light. Self  love is a reflexive modality of  sympathy.5 We know
ourselves only insofar as we can look at ourselves with the eyes of
 others. Man’s consciousness is deeply rooted in social, sympathetic
 interactions.
5. Conclusion
The aim of  this paper was to further our understanding of  Smith’s con-
ception of  economic exchange. To that end we decided to identify the
language of  commerce. Three significant conclusions may be drawn
from this analysis. First, the coherence of  Smith’s system is emphasized.
We went far beyond the traditional combination of  his moral and
 economic treatises to include his lectures on rhetoric, a youth writing
1 «No man but a beggar depends on benevolence, and even they would die in a week were
their entire dependence upon it»: lj(b), 220.
2 «It is not the soft power of  humanity, it is not that feeble spark of  benevolence which
 Nature has lighted up in the human heart, that is thus capable of  counteracting the strongest
impulses of  self-love»: tms, iii.3.4.
3 See Force 2003, 132. Note that benevolence is to be found in wn, v.iii.31 with people mak-
ing «family settlements» and providing for «remote futurity».
4 Remember the first lines of  the tms: «However selfish man may be supposed, there are
 evidently some principles in his nature, which interest him in the fortune of  others, and  renders
their happiness necessary to him, though he derives nothing from it except the pleasure of  seeing it».
5 For a similar idea see Dupuy 1992, 80.
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whose importance has so far been neglected by historian of  economic
thought. Together with his later lectures on jurisprudence, they exhib-
it Smith’s continuity of  thought and the fecundity of  a great but unfin-
ished intellectual system. As was redundantly shown, the Adam Smith
Problem vanishes once we accept to cross the texts. From this point, an
analogy between the exchange of  sentiments, opinions and goods was
developed so that man may be seen as a ‘commercial’ animal. Smith
provides us with a unified conception of  human nature which cannot
be reduced to the «selfish hypothesis». Here comes our second point.
Far from the vision of  the Chicago School, where Smith is considered
as the founding father a economic science for having identified human
nature with self-interest,1 we argued that what was seminal in exchange
relationships is not man’s autonomy and selfishness. Rather we should
look at the passage of  the brewer, the baker and the butcher as one in
which people’s concern for others is put into light.2 We cannot satisfy
ourselves if  we do not satisfy others too. Consequently, we have to
imagine and to see us as if  we were at their place. Only through this
process of  changing places can we get our true self  interest. Self  love is
appealed to because it is much more persuasive than benevolence. For
we «are not ready to suspect any person of  being defective in selfish-
ness» while the same could not be said of  benevolence (tms, vii.ii.3.16).
Yet, it is not to say that people in exchange are immoral or even amoral.
The virtuous character of  the ‘economic man’, not different from man
in general, was underlined through the workings of  the duality of
moral judgments. Both the social and the ethical constraints create the
conditions for a virtuous commerce. Three of  Smith’s four cardinal
virtues (prudence, justice and self-command) are met. Impartiality and
consciousness are fostered. For Smith, commerce is founded on coop-
eration, not on conflict.3 That’s why commerce «ought to be, among
men as among individuals, a bond of  union and friendship» (wn,
iv.iii.c.9).
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